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ASYLUM, SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND
THE NON-STATE ACTOR: THE CHALLENGE
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Michael G. Heyman*
This Article argues that the current approaches to asylum claims based on "social
group" membership under the U.N. convention Relation to the Status of Refugees
are deeply flawed. The Refugee Convention confers asylum on persons persecuted
for their membership in a particular social group. Courts have struggled with the
boundaries of the social group definition, and there appears to be no coherent way
to reconcile all of the court decisions on what groups qualify as social groups un-
der the Refugee Convention.
This Article suggests that courts adopt a consistent definition of what constitutes a
social group. The definition proposed in this Article focuses on social perception in
the home country of the asylum applicant, and would modestly expand the num-
ber of individuals who could successfully claim they were persecuted because of
membership in a social group. The Article argues this response is particularly ap-
propriate in light of a major trend in immigration law: asylum applicants
increasingly seek protection from persecution not directly from the government, but
from non-state actors who are able to persecute their victims because of government
indifference to the plight of members of a social group.
Part I of this Article introduces the general objectives and structure of asylum law,
and its embodiment in the Geneva convention. Part H explains the current law
concerning the social group category, and suggests that courts have failed to pro-
vide a consistent standard for social group membership, instead relying on ad hoc
decisions about particular claims. Part I goes on to suggest that one major reason
for this incoherence is that courts paid insufficient attention to claims of persecu-
tion by non-state actors. Part III addresses the problems the non-state actor poses
for asylum law. Part IV addresses the particular issue of asylum claims arising
out of domestic abuse. It reviews international cases on the subject and the Board
of Immigration Appeals' decision in R-A-. Part IV argues R-A- s defines social
groups too narrowly, and that courts should allow some claims of asylum based on
domestic abuse.
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. 1967, Temple University;
M.A. 1968, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1972, George Washington University National Law
Center; L.L.M. 1976, New York University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
2001 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Refugee Conven-
tion.' Enacted in the troubled aftermath of World War II, it crafted
an international definition of "refugee" that was binding upon the
world community.2 Prior compacts had consisted of reactions to
local crises or discrete ethnic groups, thus constituting situational
responses to refugee needs.3 Transcending those limitations, the
Convention created universal norms for protection.
The initial draft of the refugee definition protected those who
feared persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political
opinion. Thereafter, perceiving a troubling gap in coverage, the
Swedish representative to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries
amended the definition to include membership in a particular so-.
cial group.4 Coming as a virtual afterthought and receiving little
attention, this amendment expanded the refugee definition in
ways unimaginable at that time.
As refugee law developed in the first few decades of the Refugee
Convention, social group membership received little attention. It
remained, as Professor Maryellen Fullerton pointed out, a "little
used term of art" within refugee law." During a turbulent period of
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature july 28, 2001,
189 U.N.T.S. 127 [hereinafter Convention]. The Refugee Convention applied to events oc-
curring prior to January 1, 1951. Its scope was enlarged by the Protocol of 1967 Relating to
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, TI.A.S. No.
6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol]. It applied to those who suffered as a result of
events occurring afterJanuary 1, 1951. The United States adopted these standards when it
became a party to the Protocol. Thereafter, it enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which incor-
porated the essential provisions of the Convention. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
2. Article 1 (A) (2) of the Refugee Convention applies only to those who have a well-
founded fear of persecution "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion... Though the terms "refugee" and "asylum"
are both used in this Article, they are not distinct concepts. A person seeking asylum must
meet the requirements for "refugee" status. She is simply applying in the country in which
she seeks refuge, rather than being admitted under an overseas refugee program.
3. See generally NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION (1953).
4. The Swedish representative, Sture Petren, said, "[e]xperience has shown that cer-
tain refugees had been persecuted because they belonged to a particular social group." The
amendment was adopted without dissent. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at
Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 509-10 (1993). See also 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1966).
5. Maryellen Fullerton, Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group: Juris-
prudence in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 381, 444 (1990).
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civil wars and crises, claims based on political opinion dominated.6
Though still central, it now shares center stage with group mem-
bership, as claims based on membership have "increased
dramatically ... pushing the boundaries of refugee law.... ,7 Cases
have dealt with an exceptional range of matters, including domes-
tic violence," persecution based on disabilities," and various forms
of persecution based on sexual orientation.0 But as the body of law
has grown, covering many different kinds of social groups, so too
has confusion surrounding this notion of group membership. With
each new decision, the task of rationalizing a coherent approach to
social group has become increasingly difficult.
These difficulties are particularly apparent when the persecution
is by the non-state actor. Straining core doctrine, claims alleging
persecution by the non-state actor produced several distinct prob-
lems. First, despite the need to define carefully the relevant social
groups, courts largely reacted situationally, adopting unhelpful, ad
hoc responses to these challenges. 12 Unfortunately, this approach
6. Indeed, the burgeoning law in the area spawned debates and divides within the US
Courts of Appeal, often centering on matters such as whether "imputed political opinion"
satisfied the refugee definition. See Michael G. Heyman, Redefining Refugee: A Proposal for
Relieffor the Victims of Civil Strife, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 449, 456-461 (1987).
7. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 'Membership in a Particular Social Group" Analy-
sis and Proposed Conclusions, Background Paper for "Track Two" of the Global Consultations for the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (E. Feller et al.
eds., forthcoming 2003).
8. See, e.g., Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (2001) (Mexican child abused by
her father granted asylum based on nuclear family membership), vacated and remanded to
Board of Immigration Appeals, 273 F.3d 1220 (Dec. 7, 2001).
9. For example, the INS granted asylum to an autistic Pakistani boy whose mother
feared that he would be persecuted because "relatives and neighbors in Pakistan said the
boy was cursed by Allah and possessed by demons." 78 Interpreter Releases 604 (April 2,
2001).
10. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (Russian lesbian underwent
electroshock therapy, forced sedation and institutionalization to "cure" her).
11. Although the Refugee Convention generally contemplates persecution by govern-
ments, the UNHCR Handbook acknowledges the possibility of persecution by a non-state
actor: "Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local
populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the au-
thorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection." OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 17 (1979) [hereinafter Handbook].
12. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996) (female genital
mutilation ("FGM") to be performed on an adolescent, tribal member). There, though the
Board generally agreed that the claim should be granted, it hardly settled on its approach to
the issue. The majority xiewed the group as "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe and who oppose the practice." Id. at 367.
Member Rosenberg instead preferred to define the group based on gender, finding it
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virtually abdicates responsibility for developing a principled, con-
sistent methodology."' As a result, these often-elaborate attempts at
group definition seem tailored to particular cases, scarcely captur-
ing the characteristics of truly cognizable groups.14
These flawed efforts are understandable, however, because of a
second requirement of the refugee definition: the need to estab-
lish a nexus between group membership and persecution. The
Refugee Convention requires persecution because of group mem-
bership.'5 Because this provision has been interpreted to require
proof of the persecutor's motive, 6 courts have, often agonizingly,
sought to discern the motives of people far away and far-removed.
It is here that domestic law has taken a particularly wrong turn, as
these efforts were frequently unsuccessful, only producing enor-
mously difficult, unnecessary burdens for the asylum seeker. This
Article will analyze the deep flaws in current approaches to claims
based on social group membership and will propose a conceptual
framework for better addressing these issues.
Part I of this Article will address the general objectives of asylum
law, and their embodiment in the Geneva Convention. Part II will
examine the difficulties created by the social group category, and
the varying efforts to cabin that concept, both in the United States
and abroad. Some advocate that groups be defined by innate
surplusage to define the social group in this case by including as an element the applicant's
opposition to the practice of female genital mutilation." Id. at 375.
13. Commenting on the opinion of Justice McHugh in Applicant A, Rodger Haines,
Deputy Chairperson of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, said that "Nei-
ther the text of the convention nor its objects and purposes can be surrendered to an
'intuitive' approach or to a complete re-writing of the text of the definition to make the
social group category embracing of all circumstances of persecution. The solution may be
difficult, but must nevertheless be attempted on a principled approach." Inter-Conference
Working Party on Membership of a Particular Social Group, Int'l Ass'n of Refugee Law
Judges Ottowa Conference, Interim Report on Membership of a Particular Social Group (Oct.
1998), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/Iarljpaper.htm.
14. See, e.g., Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F3d 1169 (2001). There, the applicant of-
fered a variety of group definitions, including "female children who are victims of child
abuse and witnesses of domestic violence and who believe that they should not have to con-
form to norms of patriarchal abuse." Id. at 1174. Although the court seemed to focus on the
nuclear family, it made frequent reference to this nuclear family as the protected group.
The case awaits final disposition in the Board of Immigration Appeals.
15. See supra note 2 (requiring that the persecution be "for reasons of" one of the five
bases listed).
16. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). There, in a case about political opin-
ion, the Court required not only proof that the applicant's persecution was politically
motivated, but also that the would-be persecutor was in some way driven to persecution
because of that political opinion. Id. at 482-483.
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traits,'7 others by associational ties, 8 and still others by some com-
bination of these factors.' Unless consensus is reached on this
issue, asylum law cannot address claims effectively based on social
group membership. But consensus is pointless unless the phe-
nomenon of the non-state actor is properly understood, as many
now claim asylum alleging persecution by the non-state actor. Part
III of the Article will address the problems created by the non-state
actor.
The Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in R-A-2° deals with
many of these issues, and will be the focus of Part IV of this article.
It reveals the indissoluble link between the how social group is de-
fined, and the manner in which the nexus requirement is treated,
especially in the case of the non-state actor. Finally, this Article will
examine the topic of domestic violence itself, with particular focus
on how international bodies have dealt with domestic violence and
asylum.
I. THE PURPOSE OF ASYLUM
Asylum affords safety to those left unprotected by their home
countries. Though citizenship carries with it notions of
membership and basic humanitarian protections, the "refugee" is
one for whom these do not exist; he is a virtual non-citizen,
because of a "factual breach of the bond between him and his
17. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985). "We interpret the
phrase 'persecution on account of membership in a particular social group' to mean perse-
cution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic." Id. at 233.
18. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the
phrase "'particular social group' implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each
other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest" who have a "voluntary asso-
ciational relationship").
19. As will be explained, infra, the proposed regulations are bottomed on the notion
of a shared "common, immutable characteristic," but include factors such as a "voluntary
associational relationship." Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,598 (Dec.
7, 2000) (hereinafter Proposed Regulations).
20. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. June 11, 1999), vacated by Attorney General
Reno on January 19, 2001, originally to have been reconsidered after the passage of pending
asylum rules published at 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000). However, on February 21,
2003, by Order No. 2661-2003, Attorney General Ashcroft directed the Board to 'refer to me
for review' its decision in R-A (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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country of origin."'" Not displaced persons," refugees are those
who are nonetheless compelled to leave their homes because of
legitimate fears of persecution. The persecutor is frequently the
state itself, but it is the individual's vulnerability, rather than the
source of the persecution, that triggers international protection. 3
Asylum offers protection when that of the home state, for whatever
reason, has failed.
Asylum may not, however, be based on a mere fear of persecu-
tion, no matter how well founded. Rather, the persecution must be
for one of the Convention reasons: race, religion, nationality, socialgrou meberhipor plitcal • • 24
group membership or political opinion. International protection
is warranted only when the bonds of trust between the individual
and the state have frayed terribly in one of those areas." Yet
whereas race, religion, nationality and even political opinion are
rather easily understood in the context of persecution, social
groups are different. It is unclear why this category was included in
the refugee definition and just what constitutes a social group for
26Convention purposes.
Despite the lack of clear, unifying elements among these five
bases for Convention protection,"7 together, they strike at persecu-
tion reflective of gross intolerance of differences between some
groups and the dominant elements in society. Numerous govern-
ment and privately sponsored reports discuss this intolerance. For
example, in its recent report on human rights violations in Iraq,
21. Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Emergent International Law Relating to Refugees: Past-Present-
Future, in 13 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 163, 192 (1987).
22. See T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act
of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of Refugee, 92 COLUM. LAW REVIEW 923, 932 (1992)
(distinguishing the legal concept of displaced person from that of refugee).
23. The Handbook clearly reflects this. Paragraph 65 notes that persecution is "nor-
mally related to action by the authorities of a country. It may also emanate from sections of
the population that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the country con-
cerned." Handbook, supra note 11, at 17.
24. See supra note 2.
25. The asylum regulations proposed in late 2000 reflect these standards. See supra
note 19. There, the commentary noted that "[Ijnherent in the concept of refugee status is
the principle that an individual requires international protection because his country of
origin or of habitual residence is not safe for him, or cannot protect him, because of perse-
cution on account of one of the five grounds specified in the definition of "refugee" (citing
Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985), and 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 100 (1966)).
26. See supra notes 18-20. Maryellen Fullerton has carefully examined the scholarly
treatises and the divides among and even within them on the constitutive factors of a social
group. See Fullerton, supra note 5.
27. That is, some are innate, such as status at birth, while others are associational in
nature.
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the Home Office of the United Kingdom ("Home Office") com-
mented on abuses in all areas covered by the Convention.21
Covering a troubling array of matters, it recounted the summary
executions of political opponents and leaders in the Shi'a religious
community, discrimination against religious minorities and ethnic
groups, and even the government's "Arabization" policy of forcibly
relocating the non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans,
and Assyrians from the Government controlled northern parts of
Iraq, into northern Iraq.m
Professor Martha Minow has focused closely on how societies
deal with perceived differences and has set out several theories to
explain this phenomenon. Examining the various approaches to
the treatment of differences in society, she has given particular
emphasis to what she calls the "social relations approach. 0 0 By that
view, statements about differences should be understood as "state-
ments of relationships,"3' whereby subjugation is justified through
attributions of difference and the invidious consequences that flow
therefrom.32
Whether the differences are religious, political, racial or ethnic,
the potential exists for control and discrimination. As Professor
Minow has illustrated, for example, gender-based discrimination
has been consistently recapitulated in human history.33 Social
groups would seem to be a particularly apt candidates for this so-
cial relations analysis, as that analysis emphasizes the social and
legal domination of vulnerable classes of people. 4 However, asylum
28. See Country Information and Policy Unit, Country Assessment-Iraq (Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/default.asp?pageid=179.
29. Id. Given this extraordinary degree of abuse, it is little wonder that for the period
from 1991 through September of 2001, of all the asylum claims filed with asylum officers in
the United States, applicants from Iraq were granted asylum at the highest rate, 84.2%. 22
Refugee Reports No. 12, at 6 (2001).
30. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 110 (1990).
31. Id. at 111.
32. Id.
33. Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the Violence, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851 (2000). "But the gender analysis resonates for many people and
supports the political movement to name and respond to intimate violence. The gender
analysis locates domestic violence as a feature of a patriarchal society. Such a society makes
control and ownership the aspirations for men, including control and ownership of women
and children." Id. at 863.
34. Indeed, Krista Daley and Ninette Kelley emphasized the importance of protecting
groups from discrimination in their exercise of basic human rights: "The appropriate inter-
pretative approach to the meaning of 'particular social group' should therefore 'take into
account the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti-
discrimination that form the basis for the international refugee protection initiative." Krista
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law, both here and internationally, has often stumbled when at-
tempting to provide a coherent concept of the social group
category. Perhaps limited by the spare, unexplained language of
the refugee definition, it has taken several, often conflicting ap-
proaches to clarifying that concept. In so doing, it has frequently
confused the characteristics of those groups with what has pro-
pelled oppressors to persecute their members. It has ignored the
verifiable data about patterns of persecution, instead looking for
some internal, defining characteristics that provide the basis for
definitions of social groups. These misplaced efforts have resulted
in the muddle in which the law currently finds itself.
II. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Social group scholarship is replete with attempts at categoriza-
tion. Because of the indeterminacy of the definition and the lack
of contextual guidance, all serious commentators have sought to
capture the essence of this concept and then to apply it to concrete
cases.15 Despite the diversity of approaches, all have, at least, re-
jected the notion that the group exists by reason of the persecution
itself, for were that so, the group category might render the others
36
superfluous.
Daley & Ninette Kelley, A Human Rights Based Approach to Particular Social Group: The Cana-
dianExperience, 12 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 148 (2000).
35. For example, examining the five grounds of persecution, Grahl-Madsen classified
them into those involving matters over which people had no control, and those over which
they had control. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 25, at 217. However, though he characterized
group membership as something over which people had control, he nonetheless included
some matters over which people had no control, such as social rank and minority status. Id.
at 219. By contrast, Goodwin-Gill emphasized the "shared interests, values, or background"
of people in arriving at his notion of group membership. Thus, by his thinking, group
membership could be either a product of accident or choice. Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2nd. ed. 1996). Indeed, Goodwin-Gill acknowledged
the "open-endedness" of this concept, reflecting that it can develop, based on the "notice
taken of it by others." Id.
36. "Allowing persecutory conduct of itself to define a particular social group would,
in substance, permit the 'particular social group' ground to take on the character of a safety
net. It would impermissibly weaken, if it did not destroy, the cumulative requirements of
'fear of persecution', 'for reasons of and 'membership of a particular social group' in the
definition of 'refugee.' It would also effectively make the other four grounds of persecution
superfluous." Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 190
CLR 225, 263 (Austl.) (McHugh,J., concurring).
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A. Judicial Doctrinal Development: Associational
Ties and Protected Characteristics
Early attempts at developing the concept of social group mem-
bership focused on the associational nature of groups, and that
seemed sensible. Whereas race, religion and nationality seem to
center on matters beyond the applicant's control, political choices
and social group membership may represent personal choices that
warrant protection. And, at least until recently, the two forms of
claims were frequently tied together. Certainly, Sanchez-Trujillo v.
IN 7 represents that type of claim, wherein the applicants sought
to avoid being returned to war-torn El Salvador. They asserted that
their political affiliations and activities placed them at risk, citing
various run-ins with the government and police. However, their
claim based on group membership was cast differently. They
sought protection on the basis of their status as "young, urban,
working class" males without military service. 8 The critical question
was, then, the cognoscibility of that group within the notion of "so-
cial group.
3 9
Addressing that issue, the Ninth Circuit first constructed the es-
sential distinction between a broad, statistical group and social
group for Convention purposes.4 0 By its view, the mere existence of
distinguishing characteristics did not lead to the conclusion that
those with such characteristics belonged to a particular social
group. Thus, even were "a group of males taller than six feet" at
greater risk in a society than others, they would not, in and of
themselves, constitute a social group. 4' That sort of "demographic
division" did not represent the kind of "cohesive, homogeneous
group" to which the term should apply.4 2 Unfortunately, the court
took less care in what it constructed than it did in what it rejected.
Concluding that groups must show distinctive characteristics, it
also reasoned that membership must be a matter of choice:
Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associa-
tional relationship among the purported members, which
37. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 1573.
39. Id. at 1575.
40 Id. at 1577.
41. Id. at 1576.
42. Id. at 1577.
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imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to
their identity as a member of that discrete social group.43
Surely, this policy choice does not logically follow. A group could
be cohesive, yet membership could be innate. Indeed, the "proto-
typical example"44 offered by the court, the immediate family,
could be as easily characterized as the product of biology as of
choice.
The view promulgated by the Sanchez-Trujillo Court conflicted
with administrative practice, the view of other circuits and state
practice abroad. Yet, only recently did that court retreat from it. In
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS,4 5 the court considered the claim of a gay
man from Mexico that he faced persecution because of his sexual
orientation. In an apparent about-face, the court found the claim-
ant worthy of asylum, finding that "sexual identity is inherent to
one's very identity as a person.
46
Acknowledging the tension thus created with Sanchez-Trujillo, the
court ostensibly built on that case instead of overruling it. By its
new formulation, a particular social group is "one united by a vol-
untary association, including a former association, or by an innate
characteristic that is fundamental to the identities or consciences
of its members that members either cannot or should not be re-
quired to change it."4 7 It did, to its satisfaction, harmonize its
standard with that used by the Board of Immigration Appeals as
well as significant international opinions. s In so doing, it also
aligned itself more closely with established practice in this country.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's idiosyncratic view, the Board of
Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Acosta,4" reflects the
dominant approach to group definition, both here and interna-
tionally. Again, a Salvadoran filed an unsuccessful claim. Again, it
was unsuccessful 0 Yet the Board's construction of "social group"
differed greatly from that of the Ninth Circuit.
43. Id. at 1576 (footnote omitted).
44. Id.
45. 225 F.3d. 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
46. Id. at 1093.
47. Id. (footnote omitted).
48. "This formulation recognizes the holding of Sanchez-Trujilo and harmonizes it with
Acosta's immutability requirement. It is similar to the Supreme Court of Canada's definition
of the term" Id. (citing Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] S.C.R. 689). Id.
49. 191 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985).
50. Id.
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Acosta feared persecution at the hands of both the guerillas and
the government.5' Basing his claim on both his political views and
his group membership, he asserted that COTAXI drivers52 and oth-
ers in the transportation industry were subject to persecution. "5
Though the Board readily dismissed his assertions about the gov-
ernment's persecution, it was hospitable to his claims of
susceptibility to guerilla persecution. The guerillas had a well-
established practice of harming those who, like Acosta, refused to
join in work stoppages in San Salvador.!4 However willing the Board
was to acknowledge the legitimacy of these fears, it didn't accede to
the claim that he therefore belonged to a cognizable social group.
Thus, though he faced "punishment.5 for his refusal to join in the
work stoppages, he could avoid it "either by changing jobs or by
cooperating in work stoppages.,,
The Board's test stood in stark contrast to that of Sanchez-Trujillo.
Decidedly rejecting the defining factor of associational ties, it re-
lied instead on one of protected characteristics:
[W]e interpret the phrase 'persecution on account of mem-
bership in a particular social group' to mean persecution that
is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group
of persons all of whom share a common, immutable charac-
teristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one
such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it
might be a shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of group
characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever
the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be
one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences .
The Board clearly focused on matters that people are either
powerless to change or should not be compelled to change. Surely
51. Id. at 231.
52. Acosta formed a cooperative organization of taxi drivers known as COTAXI in
1976. Id. at 216.
53. Id. at 232.
54. Id. at 234.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 233.
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social groups can be defined that way, but it is unclear whether that
should be the exclusive definition. Persecution due to one's innate
traits cannot be countenanced. Why should that immutability pro-
vide a necessary condition to humanitarian protection? To so limit
it would exclude groups "defined by factors that may involve a
good deal of individual choice such as economic activity, educa-
tion, and shared aspirations."5  Acosta and Sanchez-Trujillo take
diametrically opposed positions to group definition, but it is un-
clear just why group membership must submit itself to this form of
either/or definition.
B. The INS's Approach
However, other bodies have sought to clarify the concept of "so-
cial group." The UNCHR Handbook is surprisingly spare on these
issues, delineating only the most rudimentary features of group
membership.59 Yet, though it barely adumbrates a theory of social
groups, its almost passing reference to both associational ties and
innate characteristics hints at more inclusive treatment.
But the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), or "the
Service" has also played a role here, finally suggesting its own,
somewhat eclectic, approach. Reacting to the various formulations,
the regulations proposed by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service at the end of 2000 incorporate much from these seemingly
disparate tests for group definition.6°
Though designed to address a variety of issues in the asylum
area, those proposed regulations were also meant to correct the
58. See generally Fullerton, supra note 5. Professor Aleinikoff has lodged a similar criti-
cism, noting the exclusion by Acosta of groups such as "students, union members,
professionals, refugee camp workers, or street children." Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 42. As
Professor Aleinikoff also points out, to subsume groups such as students within the Acosta
formulation by talking of their pursuits as something they should not be compelled to
change strains that category "for the sake of reaching an appropriate result without throw-
ing over the protected characteristics approach." Id.
59. Handbook, supra note 11. In paragraph 77, it simply notes that the term social
group "comprises persons of similar background, habits or social status." In paragraph 78,
the Handbook notes that people can be at risk because "there is no confidence in the group's
loyalty to the Government or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity
of its members, or [because] the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an
obstacle to the Government's policies."
60. See supra note 19.
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problems created by R-A-' Drawing from both "administrative and
judicial precedent," the Service set out to provide a "non-exclusive
list of additional factors that may be considered in determining
whether a particular social group exists.",2 Recognizing that the
precedents frequently conflicted, it rejected the disjunctive, mutu-
ally exclusive approaches generally used until that time and instead
sought to provide factors for judicial consideration that were rele-
vant, but are "not requirements for the existence of a particular
social group.,63
The INS's approach was built on, but not limited to, Acosta.
Though animated by the notion that "protected characteristics" "
represent the touchstone for group membership, it expanded the
Acosta view that groups consist only of those who share common,
immutable characteristics. Thus, though proceeding from the core
notions from Acosta, it provided factors that may be considered in
addition to those "required factors."'' Those factors include
whether:
1) The members of the group are closely affiliated
with each other;
2) The members are driven by a common motive or
interest;
3) A voluntary associational relationship exists among
the members;
4) The group is recognized to be a societal faction or
is otherwise a recognized segment of the population
in the country in question;
5) Members view themselves as members of the group;
and
6) The society in which the group exists distinguishes
members of the group for different treatment or
status than is accorded to other members of the so-
ciety.
6
61. See supra note 20. "This proposed rule removes certain barriers that the In re R-A-
decision seems to pose to claims that domestic violence, against which a government is ei-
ther unwilling or unable to provide protection, rises to the level of persecution of a person
on account of membership in a particular social group." 65 Fed. Reg. 76,589.
62. Id. at 76,594.
63. Id.




University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
These factors are remarkable for both their internal inconsis-
tency and expansiveness. Though affiliation, common interests and
voluntary association may be characteristics of those who share
immutable traits, they are more commonly associated with those
who come together for a common purpose; those features strike
more at the Sanchez-Trujillo vision of groups, than that of Acosta.
However, the last three factors may often partake of neither.
Rather, they reflect a new, developing approach to group defini-
tion, one emphasizing "cultural resonance" or "social difference,"
rather than looking at the internal properties of groups. Thus,
the proposed regulations suggest a third approach to group mem-
bership, which, emphasizing the social perception of groups within
particular cultures, recognizes that protection should be extended
to those from societies dramatically intolerant of differences.
This approach differs fundamentally from those of its predeces-
sors. Rather than seeking some property of groups that is
consistent with Convention purposes, it inverts the perspective by
focusing on how cultures perceive groups. The Acosta and Sanchez-
Trujillo views may converge, because cultures may condemn people
either for what they are or what they do; this hybrid view is
grounded in empirical phenomena rather than abstract definition.
And, this latter view is particularly useful, as group definitions can
be validated by observable patterns of persecution, such as the
types of conduct discussed by the UK Home Office 68 and virtually
all human rights reports.
This shift in perspective is critical since, as the cases demon-
strate, the approach taken to defining groups determines the
coverage of humanitarian protection. The Acosta and Sanchez-
Trujillo approaches tacitly posit a neutral onlooker reacting to
characteristics of those persecuted. But that's just the point: those
who persecute are not neutral, as their conduct reveals deep an-
tipathy toward those they persecute. The hybrid approach of the
67. Parish, supra note 22, at 945-946.
68. See supra note 28 and accompanying discussion.
69. Naturally, resort to empirical data can both prove and disprove the existence of
claimed groups. "How the persecutors themselves or the general public perceive the group
is far more likely to help prove whether a group is a target for persecution. Conversely, if the
purported group is not perceived as a social group by outsiders, then those alleging persecu-
tion could not have been persecuted based on their membership in the purported social
group. Therefore, the absence of an outside perception that a particular social group exists
is a much more accurate indication of the non-existence of a social group, and of whether
the social group was a target for persecution, than is the absence of a voluntary associational
relationship among purported members." Siobhan M. Kelly, Social Group-Based Asylum Claims
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 895, 914 (2000).
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INS implicitly recognizes this, suggesting that social groups are
more naturally recognized by seeing the persecuted through the
eyes of the persecutor. That approach, focusing as it does on the
persecutor's perspective, also more readily reveals the motive for
the persecution. The Australian High Court's decision in Applicant
A represents the best-developed judicial embodiment of this ap-
proach to social groups.7
C. Applicant A: A Natural Perspective
Chinese efforts to control population growth have produced
myriad legal and political reactions, both in the United States and
abroad.7 ' Though the specter of forced sterilization may seem
clearly persecutory, it challenges conventional doctrine on several
fronts. Though extreme, it may simply represent a sovereign's at-
tempt to address a serious population crisis. Moreover, even if
sterilization is regarded as persecution, it is unclear whether it has
a causal nexus to Convention grounds.
The case of Applicant A addressed these concerns, and has re-
ceived a great deal of critical attention for its detailed, probing
analysis of critical asylum issues. A Chinese husband and wife filed
applications for asylum under the Australian Migration Act of
1958.2 They left the People's Republic of China when the wife was
eight months pregnant, and soon thereafter the child was born in
70. Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 190 CLR
225 (Austl.).
71. The American experience is particularly rich. A flurry of activity followed the kill-
ings at Tiananmen Square from June 1989. Following the Board's decision in Matter of
Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. May 12, 1989) (finding that Chinese population controls
did not constitute persecution), Congress passed a statute, the Emergency Chinese Relief
Act of 1989, H.R. 2712, § 3(a), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (providing for "careful consid-
eration" to asylum applicants from the People's Republic of China who indicate a "fear of
persecution upon return to China related to China's 'one couple, one child' family plan-
ning policy"). President George H.W. Bush vetoed the bill, but embraced its spirit, as
expressed in Executive Orders and memoranda. See generally 66 Interpreter Releases 1331
(Dec. 4, 1989). The Department of Justice promulgated new asylum regulations following
that spirit, but they did not take effect because of the change in administration in 1992.
Eventually, Congress changed national policy in the 1996 amendments to the Immigration
and Nationality Act, expressly declaring that resistance to a "coercive population control
program" constituted resistance to persecution on account of political opinion. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a), amended by8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1997).
72. As is the case with most countries, Australia passed a domestic statute embracing
the Convention definition of refugee. Migration Act (1958), § 4(1) (definition of refugee)
and pt. 2, div. 1AA (refugees).
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Australia. 3 By the husband's account, he feared sterilization as he
insisted that forced abortion and sterilization were the primary
means used to enforce the one child policy. He had, for example,
seen the "Family Planning Police come to a neighbour's home in
his village and forcibly attempt to take a male neighbour away for
sterilisation."7 4 After traversing a tortuous legal path, the couple
appealed to the High Court of Australia.7
Though the justices' opinions ranged broadly, they centered on
two critical features of asylum law: the interaction of the elements
of the refugee definition and the approach to defining a social
group. All conceded that asylum required proof of legitimate fears
of persecution because of group membership. However, the jus-
tices diverged over the precise relationship that must exist between
the identity and conduct of asylum seekers.
Chief Justice Brennan had an easy time with this case. Envision-
ing the social group category as a "'safety net' for those who fell
within it,' 76 he saw this category as providing protection for those
who deserve it, but who are not otherwise covered by the refugee
definition. Thus, he simply required that group members possess a
characteristic "that is not common to the members of the society at
large.' Implicitly rejecting Acosta, he did not require that the
characteristic be "'innate or unchangeable' before it can distin-
guish a social group. 7 8 Accordingly, he concluded that "[t]he
characteristic of being the parent of a child and not having volun-
tarily adopted an approved birth-preventing mechanism
distinguishes the appellants as members of a social group that
shares that characteristic., 79 Other Justices found things much
more complex.
Justices Dawson and McHugh chafed at the notion that the exis-
tence of persecution in itself would define a group.80 They required
a more principled elaboration of the social group category than
was afforded by Chief Justice Brennan's proposed "safety net."
73. The facts of the case were not in dispute. Though the justices individually recited
the facts, this account is from Justice Kirby's opinion. 190 CLR at 288-289.
74. Id. at 288.
75. Id. at 226 (procedural history).




80. "There is more than a hint of circularity in the view that a number of persons may
be held to fear persecution by reason of membership of a particular social group where what
is said to unite those persons into a particular social group is their common fear of persecu-
tion." Id. at 242.
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Stressing the "interaction" of the components of the refugee
definition, Justice McHugh determined that the particular appli-
cants' fears of persecution were based on their refusal to submit to
national policy, rather than from group membership.8' He thus
created a subtle distinction between consequences that result from
conduct and those flowing from group identity. 2 Though he may
have overlooked the social resonance that flowed from active op-
position to population control, his conception of "social group"
itself casts a broad net for protection, exceeding that of extant
models.
McHugh regarded "social group" as a malleable concept, driven
by social perceptions within particular societies."" Tracing the cate-
gory to the social upheaval following World War II, he agreed with
Goodwin-Gill that the category was "'intended to cover those
groups persecuted because of the 'restructuring' of society then
being undertaken in the socialist States and the special attention
reserved for landowners, capitalist class members, independent
business people, the middle class and their families., 84 But he
would hardly limit its coverage to those groups. Indeed, he repeat-
edly, almost relentlessly, stressed that "public perception," rather
than any internal characteristic, was the key to group existence. 85
81. 190 CLR at 257.
82. Like his fellowjustices, McHugh resisted the conventional tests for group member-
ship, expressly rejecting Sanchez-Trujillo. Id. at 266.
83. This notion is hardly peculiar to the Australian High Court. In Regina v. Immigra-
tion Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2 A.C. 629 (H.L. 1999), Lord Hope of Craighead made
much the same point:
In general terms a social group may be said to exist when a group of people with a
particular characteristic is recognized as a distinct group by society. The concept of a
group means that we are dealing here with people who are grouped together because
they share a characteristic not shared by others, not with individuals. The word 'so-
cial' means that we are being asked to identify a group of people which is recognized
as a particular group by society. As social customs and social attitudes differ from one
country to another, the context for this inquiry is the country of the person's nation-
ality. The phrase can thus accommodate particular social groups which may be
recognizable as such in one country but not in others or which, in any given country,
have not previously been recognized.
84. Applicant A, 190 CLR at 265, quoting Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTER-
NATIONAL lAW 46 (2nd ed. 1996).
85. "If the group is perceived by people in the relevant country as a particular social
group, it will usually but not always be the case that they are members of such a group." Id.
at 264. Though McHugh recognized the need for some "internal linking" lest persecution
alone define the group, he saw societal perception as fundamental. Id.
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This "societal perception" made people "stand out," and thus be-
come targets for persecution. "'
Societal perception, then, both identifies and creates social
groups. They become the targets of persecution precisely because
of this perception and, in turn, are identifiable as groups warrant-
ing protection by looking through those social optics. As McHugh
explained:
The fact that actions of the persecutors can serve to identify
or even create 'a particular social group' emphasises the point
that the existence of such a group depends in most, perhaps
all cases on external perceptions of the group. The notion of
persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social
group implies that the group must be identifiable as a social
unit.
8 7
If followed, this social perception approach running through
McHugh's opinion and those of other court members frees the
decision-maker from the constraints of either simplistic tests or cul-
tural parochialism. Justice Kirby acknowledged the universality of
the Convention definition, but resisted a Western application of
the concept of social groups. For him, "in other societies, and in
modern times, different cultural norms and social imperatives may
give rise to different sources of persecution."88 And, perhaps ironi-
cally, this approach to social groups advances the pragmatic
concerns of asylum law, as group membership using that as a vehi-
cle easily lends itself to empirical verification unconfined by the
limits of abstract tests.s9
D. The Aftermath ofApplicant A
The approach of the Applicant A Court has not gone unnoticed.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
recently issued a set of guidelines on the social group component.
Designed to "provide legal interpretative guidance for govern-
86. Id. at 266.
87. Id. at 264.
88. Id. at 293.
89. Naturally, this is also the case under the proposed asylum regulations, in that they
direct the decision-maker to look to the societal perception of groups.
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ments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary,"")
they provide an approach that dovetails with that of the High
Court of Australia. State practice may now be evolving into a uni-
versal norm to guide the world community.!"l
But though groups are a product of social perception, courts
and others must still be able to identify and describe them.
McHugh may have been wrong on the facts of the Chinese dy-
namic, but he was still right to insist on a group existence
independent of the persecution. Unfortunately, regardless of the
approach to group determinations, few courts have satisfactorily
defined the groups that face persecution. The definitions have ei-
ther been terribly broad, or outlandishly narrow. Often, they've
even seemed tailored for litigation purposes.
As discussed above, for example, Justice Brennan elaborated on
the possibilities for group definition. Discussing the evolution of
Chinese policy, he noted the sub-categories of people produced by
that evolving policy. They consisted of "'people with one child,'
'people with more than one child,' 'the floating population who
are parents,' 'rural people with children,' [and] 'minority national-
ity couples with children."' ' 2 Thus, though he settled on the
characteristic of "being a parent of a child and hot having voluntar-
ily adopted an approved birth-preventing mechanism, '3 the other
possibilities illustrate the elaborate, unconvincing group defini-
tions populating asylum case law.
9 4
90. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a particular so-
cial group" within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (2002) [hereinafter
Guidelines on International Protection].
91. The guidelines deal with social group definition in two ways. First, UNHCR adopts
what it calls the "protected characteristics" approach, essentially tracking Acosta. However,
recognizing that exclusive use of that approach might be under-inclusive, it recommended
the adoption of the social perception test. It said:
If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be
neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to deter-
mine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that
society. So, for example, if it were determined that owning a ship or participating in a
certain occupation in a particular society is neither unchangeable nor fundamental
aspect of human identity, a shopkeeper or members of a particular profession might
nonetheless constitute a particular social group if in the society they are recognized as a
group which sets them apart.
Id. at paragraph 13 (emphasis added).
92. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 237 (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985).
93. Id. at 238.
94. See Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (2001). There, the formulations con-
sisted of "a family in which her father is a perpetrator of domestic violence, a family of
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Commenting on the wildly elaborate group definitions, Stephen
Legomsky suggests a way out of this quagmire. He suggests that
instead of flailing about to construct terribly precise qualifiers, de-
cision-makers should recognize that the "on account of"
requirement only suggests a causal connection between member-
ship and persecution. Thus, he suggests vastly simpler group
definitions, reasoning that the evidence need only show that "but
for" the characteristic of the applicant, the persecution would not
occur. 15 Then, any fear of a floodgate of claims would be quelled by
the additional evidentiary requirement that the applicant demon-
strate that the abuse would rise to the level of persecution, which
would greatly aid the decisional process.96
The High Court in Applicant A concluded, by a 3-2 vote, that the
claim was inadequate. Though we may quibble with that outcome,
the court substantially advanced thinking on asylum issues. Asylum
exists to protect those for whom the state has failed, and the social
perception approach best identifies those groups that face persecu-
tion. Those who "stand out" and deviate from the norms of those
in power may thus become the targets of persecutors. In Applicant
A, the state itself was the purported source of persecution, but asy-
lum law has grown to recognize that persecution may come from a
variety of sources in society.
domestic violence, female children who are victims of child abuse and witnesses of domestic
violence and who believe that they should not have to conform to norms of patriarchal
abuse and children who have become targets of domestic violence by trying to protect their
mothers from domestic violence." Id. at 1174.
95. STEPHEN H. 1,EGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 964-67 (3d
ed. 2002). Commenting on In reKasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996), Profes-
sor Legomsky wrote: "Since the Board's own case law (Acosta) and the law of the circuit in
which the case was decided both make it easy to hold that women are a social group (period,
the only possible reason for the Board in Kasinga to flail around in search of all those quali-
fiers is its unstated assumption that, without such qualifiers, 'on account of' would have
been an obstacle to relief." LEGOMSKY, supra, at 964.
96. This is not to suggest that the issue of causation is quite that simple, but the "but
for" approach is sensible. More extensive analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
more detailed analysis of the nexus requirement, see the University of Michigan's Program
in Refugee and Asylum Law's fine set of guidelines. The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a
Convention Ground, 23 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 207, 213 (2002). In that same issue, Michelle Foster
exhaustively analyzed the causation issue, ultimately supporting the "contributing cause"
position embodied in those guidelines. Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the
Nexus Clause in the Refugee Definition, 23 MICH.J. INT'L L. 265, 338 (2002).
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III. PERSECUTION AND THE NON-STATE ACTOR
People enter into political communities to satisfy a variety of
needs. Whether these communities are clans, tribes or larger po-
litical entities, they address fundamental human needs, such as
that for protection from internal as well as external threats. Com-
munities enact codes designating standards for internal conduct
and may provide mechanisms for protection from external forces.
It's intolerable, then, when the government itself breaches that
covenant with the people. It represents the breakdown of commu-
nal life, and thus presents the clearest case for asylum protection.
State violations of the rights of citizens, though abhorrent, fre-
quently present clear-cut cases of proof. The government conduct
itself may be highly visible, and the patterns of persecution demon-
strable. Chief Justice Brennan easily traced the development of
Chinese policy on population control through its laws and regula-
tions enacted in the 1970s and 1980s.17 However we regard these
Chinese efforts, they are clearly traceable to an evolving central
policy, and the agencies of enforcement are likewise evident. How-
ever, non-state actors present more ambiguous agents of
persecution.
A non-state actor attenuates the components of the refugee
definition. Not acting at the behest of the state, he presents a more
amorphous enemy, whose patterns of conduct and motives may be
less clear. Indeed, his very identity is murkier than that of the
governmental persecutor."' Commenting on the frightening variety
of non-state actors, Professor Jennifer Moore traced the emergence
of the non-state actor in part to the devolutionary trends that
created sub-national entities, consisting of "new states, aspiring
states, or conflicted states.'99 Because of these and other global
developments, we've witnessed increasing threats to both
individual and group rights from various sources, such as "death
97. Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 190 CLR
225, 237 (Austl.).
98. SeeJoan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUm. RTS. J.
229, 240 (1996) ("In today's chaotic world, the identity and the motivations of the persecu-
tor are more elusive.... Repression comes at the hands of shadowy organizations whose
links to state authority are deliberately obscured or who portray themselves as antagonists of
the formal state.").
99. Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection From Human
Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 81, 83 (1999).
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squads, paramilitary forces, insurgent armies, organized criminal
entities, family-based political cliques, clans, or sub-clans.'
00
The non-state actor, particularly because of his myriad shapes,
presents unique analytical challenges to asylum law. Though citi-
zens have a right to protection from threats, when the agent of
persecution is not the state, it is uncertain when the state's failure
rises to an unacceptable level and warrants an asylum grant. It is
uncertain how rampant the abuses must be, how persistent they
must remain, how ineffective the government must be in combat-
ing them, tojustify the dramatic intervention of the asylum state.
Complicating matters further, though governmental persecution
may well extend throughout the state, the actions of the non-state
actor may be more confined, affording an internal flight alterna-
tive ("IFA") to some.'0 ' This outcome is vexing, for it seemingly
affords the asylum-seeker the alternative of avoiding the persecu-
tory conduct in his country, obviating the need for asylum. Indeed,
in Acosta, the Board noted that Acosta "could avoid the threats of
the guerillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in work
stoppages." 2 Requiring someone to change jobs to prevent perse-
cution avoids the proper question: whether he legitimately fears
persecution.
103
Despite these complexities, it is clear that asylum need not be
given only to those facing state persecution. Focusing on the fail-
ure of state protection as the touchstone for asylum, Roger Haines
100. Id.
101. In a background paper for a UNHCR conference, James Hathaway and Michelle
Foster presented a detailed analysis of the IFA. They set out four criteria to determine the
feasibility of internal flight and protection: 1. the accessibility of the alternative; 2. whether
the alternative offers an "antidote" to the feared persecution; 3. whether the alternative does
not entail new risks; and 4. whether at least a minimum level of affirmative state protection
is available at the place of flight. James c. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, Internal Protec-
tion/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of Refugee Status Determination (2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+fwwBm+expvdwwwwnwwwwwwwhFq
A72ZROgRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBAFqA72ZROgRfZNcFqBhd5BnGawDmarwBrwiwODzmxwwwww
ww/opendoc.pdf. In the Summary Conclusions that followed the roundtable discussion of
this issue, UNHCR expressed concerns about internal flight and the non-state actor. "Where
the risk of being persecuted emanates from a non-state actor, IPA/IRA/IFA may more often
be a relevant consideration which has though to be determined on the particular circum-
stances of each individual case." See INHCR/IOM/08/2002, UNHCR/FOM/08/2002 1
(2002) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
102. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
103. Hathaway and Foster also rejected this alternative, asserting that "refugee status
may not be refused simply because an applicant could live in safety by declining to exercise
his or her fundamental beliefs." See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 101, at 23. For them, the
notion of "safety as a duty to hide" represented a complete abnegation of the principles of
the Convention. Id.
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noted, "the refugee definition does not require that the state itself
be the agent of harm. Persecution at the hands of 'private' or non-
state agents of persecution equally falls within the definition.' 0 4 As
"it is highly likely that the majority of today's refugees are fleeing
dangers emanating from non-state agents,"0 5 the claims of their
victims appeal to us with particular urgency, calling for clear stan-
dards for relief.
A. Persecution and Gender: The International Response
Over the last few decades, the international community has
increasingly recognized the threats posed by gender-based
discrimination and persecution. 0 6  Its enactment of various
conventions as well as the promulgation of state-based positions on
gender-based persecution illustrates the pernicious, widespread
nature of these problems. The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women denounces discrimination
and requires states to attempt to deracinate it.1 7 The 1993
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women even
more specifically condemns domestic violence as one of the
104. ROGER HAINES, GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION 12 (2001). This paper was also
commissioned by UNHCR. UNHCR adopted this view in its Guidelines on International Protec-
tion, supra note 90. In those guidelines, it stated that when "offensive acts are committed by
the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by
the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection". Id.
at 5 (footnote omitted).
105. Walter Klin, Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect, 15
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 415 (2001).
106. UNHCR distinguished between sex and gender-based persecution in its
Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees (May 7, 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/
+PwwBmeU+Di8wwwwnwwwwwwwhFqhT0yfEtFqnplxcAFqhTOyfEcFqewzno1 omncoDn5adD
afDBnGDwBodDwca7GdBnqBodDeuGmonDmnGe2RqxcwBnma7nG5nqlBodDDzmxwwww
wwwlFqmRbZ/opendoc.pdf. Whereas sex is a 'biological determination,' '[g]ender refers to
the relationship between women and men based on socially or culturally constructed and
defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities that are assigned to one sex or another."
Id. at 2. This concept strikes at the power relations between men and women, and gender-
related claims include "acts of sexual violence family/domestic violence, coerced family
planning, female genital mutilation, punishment for transgression of social mores, and
discrimination against homosexuals." Id. See supra note 83.
107. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, 24 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979)
[hereinafter CEDA W.
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"crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a
subordinate position compared with men. 108
State practice has followed suit, providing gender-based guide-
lines for asylum claims. Canada became the first nation to
recognize gender as a basis for an asylum grant.'° Many countries
have followed, and the United States Department of Justice has
issued guidelines to its asylum officers to sensitize them to the par-
ticular issues related to gender-based claims. " ° The UNHCR has
recently addressed these issues,"1 ' and these notions have even fil-
tered down to municipal police throughout the world through the
enactment of United Nations guidelines for law enforcement.
1 1 2
But state practice has faltered in the judicial arena. Broad prin-
ciples of protection have not consistently provided humanitarian
relief for the victims of gender-based persecution. Professor Moore
has identified the "protection vacuum created by implicit intoler-
ance or calculated neglect on the part of the state" as one source of
this failure in the judiciary. She was particularly troubled by the
plight of victims of domestic violence in the United States. 1 3 Each
"barrier"'1 4 to effective protection she has identified is present in
R-A-. There, the majority of the Board misconstrued the notion of
social groups, failed to deal intelligibly with the notion of the non-
state actor and, because of its construction of the nexus require-
ment, interposed virtually insurmountable barriers to relief for the
victims of domestic violence.
108. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
109. CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD., GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIR-
PERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (Mar. 9, 1993.)
110. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, to A U INS Asylum Officers
and HQASM Coordinators, available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/
guidelines.us.pdf (last modified May 26, 1995).
111. See supra notes 101, 103-04, 106 and accompanying text.
112. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Centre for Human Rights,
International Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement (Geneva, 1996). Those guidelines
explicitly proscribe domestic violence, and require police to "take rigorous official action to
prevent the victimization of women." Id. at 20.
113. Moore, supra note 99, at 83, n.5.
114. Id.
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IV. THE FAILURES OF IN RE R-A-
R-A- created a remarkable tension between the law and the
poignant facts of one woman's suffering. Both sides of the Board
felt enormous compassion for Rodi Alvarado, but the majority felt
that her situation, however compelling, had no answer in asylum
law. This case, and these opinions, represent the failure of asylum
law to perform its function: providing surrogate protection where
the applicant's home country has provided none. Treating domes-
tic violence as a kind of private problem, the case fails to redress
this insidious form of persecution. Worse, though some acts of per-
secution may be episodic, and thus passing, victims of domestic
violence are particularly at risk, as they often suffer regular, persis-
tent persecution extending over long periods of time. " "
The majority characterized Alvarado's claims as reflecting "hei-
nous abuse" repeatedly inflicted upon her."6 Married at age 16, she
was victimized by her husband from the beginning. As her mar-
riage proceeded, "the level and frequency of his rage increased
concomitantly with the seeming senselessness and irrationality of
his motives."" 7 Consisting of extreme violence, rape, sodomy and
social and economic subjugation, her marriage was a virtual
nightmare from which there was no escape. Though she appealed
to the Guatemalan police, help was unavailable. On three occa-
sions summons were issued for her husband's appearance, but he
ignored them without consequence. Indeed, on the one occasion
on which she appeared before a judge, "he told her that he could
not interfere in domestic disputes.""" Having no shelters or other
organizations to turn to, she fled Guatemala in May 1995, and
eventually sought asylum in the United States."9
She appeared before an Immigration judge who found her
credible, concluded that the abuse rose to the level of persecution,
and found further that Alvarado had suffered the persecution both
because of her membership in a particular social group and her
115. As Deborah Anker pointed out, "'matrimonial violence' ... can be the most ex-
treme form of torture because there is no respite." Deborah Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and
the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs.J. 133,141 (2002) (footnote omitted).
116. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (B.I.A. June 11, 1999). Indeed, the majority
concluded, "we struggle to describe how deplorable we find the husband's conduct to have
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political opinions.120 The judge also found that the Guatemalan
government was "unwilling or unable" to control her husband's
behavior, satisfying a further requirement for asylum.''
Despite the imputed finding regarding political opinion, the
major focus of the Board was on the question of social group
membership. There, the judge concluded that she fell within a
group of Guatemalan women "'who have been involved intimately
with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination.' , 22 The Board easily agreed with the
judge's findings of fact. The abuse was "more than sufficient"'1 3 to
constitute persecution, the testimony credible and the record con-
vincing on her inability to achieve state protection. The only issue
was whether hers was simply a personal tragedy or whether it also
constituted a legitimate asylum claim. Despite its obvious compas-
sion for Alvarado, the Board concluded that she had not presented
a cognizable claim.
From the Board's view, the major impediment to relief was the
absence of a cognizable group. Envisioning her plight as a per-
sonal, domestic tragedy, it couldn't justify international
intervention. Since its analysis proceeded from the conventional
approaches to group membership, she failed to satisfy either the
Sanchez-Trujillo or Acosta approach to group definition. She had
neither entered into a "voluntary associational relationship"124 suf-
ficient for Sanchez-Trujillo, nor did her status partake of the
immutable characteristics required by Acosta. Satisfying neither ap-
proach, her claimed group membership seemed rather like a
"legally crafted description of some attributes of her tragic per-
sonal circumstances."2 5 The group was "defined largely in the
abstract,' 26 thus lacking the properties necessary for legal recogni-
tion.
The Board was limited by existing paradigms. The elaborate,
terribly specific group definition that it rejected was very much like
those discussed earlier in this Article.12 7 The Immigration Judge
accepted that group characterization, which formed the basis for
120. The judge found that, because of her resistance to her husband's act of violence,
he imputed to her the political opinion "that women should not be dominated by men." Id.
at 911.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting the opinion of the Immigration Judge).
123. Id. at 914.
124. Id. at 918.
125. Id. at919.
126. Id. at 918.
127. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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appeal. Naturally, had the case been framed differently, for in-
stance, as suggested by the High Court in Applicant A, the Board
would have been forced to deal with notions of gender-based per-
secution in a full, cultural context. As it was, the discussion took on
the hollow sound of much previous litigation.
The discussion of the non-state actor seemed similarly parochial.
Conceding that governmental failures in Guatemala resulted in an
"appalling" level of official tolerance of abuse,128 the Board none-
theless concluded that since the husband's actions were neither
"desired" nor "encouraged,' ' 0 the case was beyond the reach of
asylum law. Stressing the "independent" and "private" nature of his
conduct, it lost sight of the reason for asylum protection: to pro-
vide safety to those effectively abandoned by the failed states from
which they've come. Instead of asking whether the applicant was a
woman who had been persecuted in, at best, a disinterested coun-
try, the Board asked whether the persecution was the product of
persecutory motive.3 ° That misguided approach led the Board pro-
foundly astray. Even setting aside the obvious difficulties of
demonstrating the motives of the persecutor, it is unclear whether
an application for asylum must demonstrate more than a but-for
relationship between the characteristic and the persecution.1 3 ' The
Board clearly required much more.
The Board's discussion of this nexus requirement flowed
inexorably from its notion of the asserted group: "Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination." 132 It continued to ask whether "her husband has
targeted and harmed the respondent because he perceived her to
be a member of this particular social group."033 Through its
language, it is evident that it saw this as a private problem between
Alvarado and her husband. Because he had "targeted only the
respondent,"3 4 because she similarly "suffered and feared intimate
violence only from her husband,"'3' and because it had "scant
128. In reR-A-, 221. & N. Dec. at 922.
129. Id. at 923.
130. The Board stated, "We understand the 'on account of' test to direct an inquiry into
the motives of the entity actually inflicting the harm." Id.
131. Recall Professor Legomsky's discussion of this nexus requirement, supra note 95, at
966, where he recognized that there are frequently "two or more elements thatjointly define
the persecuted group."
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information on how he personally viewed other married women in
Guatemala,'' l". it concluded that she was "in a 'group' by herself of
women presently married to that particular man.' ' 7 Since he
confined his abuse to her, the Board apparently felt his behavior
was only that of a belligerent husband.
The Board similarly found his motivation wanting, finding that
the conduct was not the product of her group membership, but
simply of a dreadful marriage:
He harmed her, when he was drunk and when he was sober,
for not getting an abortion, for his belief that she was seeing
other men, for not having her family get money for him, for
not being able to find something in the house, for leaving a
cantina before him, for leaving him, for reasons related to his
mistreatment in the army, and 'for no reason at all.' Of all
these apparent reasons for abuse, none was 'on account of' a
protected ground, and the arbitrary nature of the attacks fur-
ther suggests it was not the respondent's claimed social group
1381
characteristics that he sought to overcome.
Presumably, then, because he tortured her indiscriminately,
these were random, and not targeted acts of persecution.'3" This
approach calls into question what would satisfy asylum require-
ments. R-A-'s dissenting opinion provides an answer.
Guided by the fundamental principle that asylum provides "sur-
rogate international protection where there is a fundamental
breakdown in state protection,"4 ° the dissent's focus was clearly on
the failed state.14' Thus, though the dissenters might have broad-
ened the group to include all Guatemalan women or all married
Guatemalan women, 2 they nonetheless found the social group
cognizable.
The dissent also found ample evidence to satisfy the nexus re-
quirement. Its analysis of the nexus proceeded from the specific,
palpable facts of this case to larger notions of male domination.




139. From the majority's view, "other factors, ranging from jealousy to growing frustra-
tion with his own life to simple unchecked violence tied to the inherent meanness of his
personality" may account for his motivation. Id. at 926.
140. Id. at 936 (Member Guendelsberger, dissenting).
141. Id. at 929.
142. Id. at 935.
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the husband's atrocities. His infliction of harm to Alvarado's geni-
tals, his attempt to abort her pregnancy and his rapes of her, all
provided vivid examples of his attempts to "dominate or subdue
her.'
43
Next, it found the majority's treatment of his indiscriminate vio-
lence ironic. Rather than bespeaking the absence of any gender-
based motivation, it demonstrated precisely that he chose to deal
with her "merely as his property."' 44 Thus, turning the majority's
reasoning on its head, it saw his seemingly senseless violence as a
disturbing manifestation of culturally condoned persecution.
Domestic violence is no haphazard, private phenomenon, but is
a social ill "rooted in the economic, social, and cultural subordina-
tion of women.' 4 The dissent placed the husband's conduct in a
larger cultural context: "[V] iolence against women not only derives
from but also sustains the dominant gender stereotypes and is used
to control women in the one space traditionally dominated by
women, the home."'4 6 It saw a tragic irony in the majority's treat-
ment of the non-state actor. It saw in her husband's very arrogant
sense of impunity, the ultimate proof that the persecution indeed
was "on account of' her group membership. Repeatedly telling her
that it would be "useless" to contact the police, he recognized that
she "would receive no protection from the authorities if she re-
sisted his abuse and persecution.', 47 She was helpless and he knew
it.
But this analysis, though convincing, seems overwrought and
unnecessary. Intuitively, we would think claims from women such
as Rodi Alvarado would be easily granted. It would seem unneces-
sary to specify the gender-specific forms of injury she suffered. Yet,
read together, the majority and dissenting opinions reveal an
enormous communication divide.
The majority saw Alvarado's suffering as personal; the dissent
saw it as a cultural manifestation. The majority inquired very
closely into the husband's specific motives. It apparently required a
showing that he was aware of the group, was aware of her member-
ship in that group and persecuted her in light of those
perceptions. The dissent only asked whether hers was the kind of
143. Id. at 938.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 939.
146. Id. (quoting U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47 Sess., Stipp. No.
38, para. 26, at8, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992)).
147. InreR-A-,22I.&N. Dec. at939.
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suffering typical of someone locked into such a dreadful relation-
ship, in which the state did not protect her. The two sides of the
Board placed different demands on asylum law. Both, however,
were trying to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Elias-Zacarias in dealing with the nexus requirement.1 48 That case,
central to American asylum law for over a decade, is unclear and it
has been widely misconstrued. As construed, though, it has proved
a major impediment to asylum claims, especially for the victims of
non-state actors.
149
B. Elias-Zacarias and its Aftermath
Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias fled war-torn Guatemala for the
United States in 1987, was apprehended by the INS and faced de-
portation) 5 At his deportation hearing, he sought asylum and
withholding of deportation. 5' The Immigration Judge and the
Board denied him relief. After a Ninth Circuit reversal, 152 the case
came before a sharply divided Supreme Court, which reversed the
Court of Appeals.
Elias-Zacarias sought asylum based on his fear of both the guer-
rillas and government in Guatemala. InJanuary 1987, when he was
18, two armed, uniformed guerrillas came to his home, asking that
he and his parents join their cause . When he and his family re-
fused, the guerrillas told them to think it over, as they would be
back. Apparently, his refusal to join was based on his fear of gov-
ernment retaliation. Thus, shortly after that visit, he left for the
United States.
The Court focused on two aspects of the refugee definition in
forming its opinion. First, it noted that Elias-Zacarias' claimed fear
of persecution on account of political opinion was baseless, as he
might have resisted recruitment for a variety of non-political
148. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
149. See Moore, supra note 99, at 111.
150. 502 U.S. at 479.
151. The term "withholding" was used until 1996, at which time Congress changed it to
"restriction on removal." The current section is captioned "Restriction on removal to a
country where alien's life or freedom would be threatened." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3) (A)
(1996). This section prohibits the Attorney General from removing an alien to a place
where her life or freedom would be threatened because of reasons set forth in the Conven-
tion.
152. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990).
153. 502 U.S. at 480-81.
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reasons.5 4 Moreover, the Court noted that even if the guerrillas
construed his refusal as a political rebuff, the persecution must be
on account of the "victim's political opinion, not the
persecutor's.",155 The majority opinion could have ended at that
point, because its requirement of politically animated resistance
had not been met.
Conceding politically motivated actions for discussion purposes,
however, the Court further rejected his claim for lack of evidence
that the guerillas would have persecuted him for his political opin-
ions. Thus, construing the "on account of' language to mean
"because," it required evidence linking the feared persecution to
the asylum seeker's political views, transforming a mere victim of
widespread violence into a refugee worthy of international recog-
nition.
That evidentiary requirement is not unreasonable. The Court
recognized that an applicant "cannot be required to provide direct
proof of his persecutors' motives. ", 56 Rather, "since the statute
makes motive critical,," 57 some proof is necessary, whether direct or
circumstantial. Elias-Zacarias was making a very personal claim; he
maintained that the guerrillas might kill him because of his per-
ceived opposition to them. The Court simply required that he
distinguish himself from the multitude of other would-be victims of
civil strife by showing that he was perceived as a political opponent,
not as a mere unfortunate caught in the crossfire." s Without any
evidence of his political activity or statements, however, he had
failed to show he feared reprisal for Convention reasons.
However, the majority opinion dealt with the issue of motive in
an almost cursory fashion, which may have been satisfactory, due to
the bareness of Elias-Zacarias' claim. But the Court's opinion has,
unfortunately, led to a spate of litigation, while providing little di-
rection to the courts facing those issues. 15 Though much of this
154. The Court recited possibilities, including "fear of combat, a desire to remain with
one's family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian life, to mention only a
few." Id. at 482.
155. Id. (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 483.
157. Id.
158. Elsewhere, I recommended the expansion of the refugee definition to protect the
unwitting victims of civil strife. See Heyman, supra note 6. Congress thereafter created "tem-
porary protected status" to provide humanitarian protection for those who do not fit the
Convention definition. It now covers those, like Elias-Zacarias, from countries engaged in
"ongoing armed conflict within the state... " 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1996).
159. "Elias-Zacarias was a narrow opinion based on its facts.... The brevity of the opin-
ion-only six pages-and the Court's constrained approach to legal interpretation results in
significant ambiguity, with major issues left unresolved. The opinion does not provide-nor
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litigation has dealt with the formidable evidentiary problems facing
applicants, the substantive concerns have focused on unraveling
motives in ambiguous contexts.
Borja v. INS"'° exemplifies these problems. Teresita Moral Borja
worked for her parents' business in the Philippines and was admit-
tedly "pro-government.', 16' She had a series of hostile encounters
with members of the New People's Army (NPA), 62 as they sought
her support and she resisted them. In addition, the NPA extracted
"revolutionary taxes" from her because of her refusal. 63 She was
the victim of extortion and physical violence because of her politi-
cal sympathies.
6 4
The Board of Immigration Appeals discerned a pattern of
"economic extortion" in this persecution, but concluded that the
extortion was exclusively "non-political." 65 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed. Quoting from the dissenting opinion of Board Member
Rosenberg, it concluded that the case represented "'extortion
plus.'"' 66 Though the NPA acted with "mixed motives," 167 the
presence of a political component brought it within Elias-Zacarias
and Convention protection. Expanding on the spare language of
Elias-Zacarias, it recognized the need to protect those facing
persecution, if only in part, because of Convention reasons.168
Though many of these cases are factually complex and have
produced strong opinions on both sides, 69 it is clear that
is it clear thatJustice Scalia intended to provide-much guidance for future adjudications by
the administrative agencies, or for review of similar questions of law by the courts." Deborah
Anker et al., The Supreme Court's Decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias: Is There Any 'There' There?, 69
Interpreter Releases 285-286 (1992).
160. 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
161. Id. at 734.
162. As the court pointed out, the New People's Army had a "well-documented history
of political violence," according to the State Department's 1995 Country Profile. Id.
163. Id.
164. Borja's testimony before the Immigration Judge recounted stories of their vio-
lence, including beatings, threats with guns and knife slashings. All seemed animated by
both political hostility and economic opportunism.
165. Id. at 736.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Legomsky, supra note 95. Arguing for the "but for" test for nexus, Legomsky
posited a circumstance under which a despot singled out university students of Asian ances-
try for persecution. Thus, though they were being persecuted on account of race, only the
subset of university students was being subjected to persecution. Yet, since they wotld not
have been persecuted "but for" their race, the persecution was "on account of" race. As he
continued, "there can be, and typically are, two or more elements that jointly define the
persecuted group." Id. See also authorities cited supra note 96.
169. The Ninth Circuit has experienced internal difficulties applying Bora. See, e.g., Ga-
foor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2000), which vividly demonstrates the difficulty of
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Elias-Zacarias does not require proof of a unitary motive. The Court
did not reach the issues at that level of sophistication.'70 Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia only required that the asylum seeker show
he fears persecution because of a protected characteristic.
Yet political opinion stands on a different footing from social
group membership, as political opinion is discernible only if af-
firmatively expressed. Elias-Zacarias should not be read as a
prescription for how to treat motive in all contexts as that goes be-
yond the scope of that rather limited opinion.
People are identified as members of particular social groups in a
variety of ways. The Chinese couple in Applicant A may have overtly
opposed Chinese population controls. Their conduct could have
set them apart as opponents of government policy. 7' Nevertheless,
to demonstrate the required nexus between group membership
and the feared persecution, they needed to have outwardly op-
posed that policy. Mere private behavior would not do.
By contrast, in Hernandez-Montiel, Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel
was granted asylum because he was a gay man with a female sexual
identity in Mexico. 72 Throughout much of his life, he had been
derided and tortured because of his manner and dress. 7" Though
the Ninth Circuit was particularly concerned with social group
definition in that case, it also confronted the government argu-
ment that the persecution was not solely "on account of' group
membership. Using the mixed motive analysis, it readily con-
cluded, "gay men with female sexual identities are recognized in
Mexico as a distinct and readily identifiable group and are perse-
cuted for their membership in that group.' ' 74 His appearance made
him stand apart, thus subjecting him to persecution.
Finally, Rodi Alvarado faced persecution simply because she was
a married woman in a country rife with unchecked domestic
determining just why persecution took place, and thus whether a Convention motive was
present (considering persecution of Indo-Fijian after his arrest of a native officer for rape of
a 13-year-old girl). For an excellent discussion of this mixed motive analysis, see Girma v.
INS, 283 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming the Board's denial of the asylum claim).
170. The court simply required that one like Elia-Zacarias demonstrate that "the guer-
rillas will persecute him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to
fight with them." 502 U.S. at 483 (emphasis in original).
171. Though they lost their case, recall that Congress broadened the American defini-
tion of refugee to expressly include those who opposed coercive population controls. See
supra note 71. Moreover, Chief Justice Brennan expressly referred to the couple's failure to
accede to voluntary birth control as "distinguishing" them as members of a particular social
group. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
172. 225 E3d. 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
173. Id. at 1099.
174. Id. at 1096.
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violence. Her claim was based on her very identity. Her daily trials
resulted from neither her conduct nor choice, but from her
existence as the wife of a vicious batterer. Each victim can justly
claim the feared persecution on account of group membership, yet
the very basis for the perception of that membership differs from
one to the other.
Just as group membership is based on different factors,175 so too
is persecution. Dissent is quelled by stringent government policies
that brook no disagreement. The personally unconventional such as
Hernandez-Montiel may suffer official separation and mistreat-
ment as well as myriad forms of personal abuse by private, non-
state actors.1 76 Others, such as Rodi Alvarado, may suffer an unend-
ing cycle of abuse and state inaction. In each, motive is revealed
differently, as the persecutors differ as much as do their forms of
persecution.
Though these nuances seemingly complicate the search for a
nexus, recognizing the symmetrical relationship between persecu-
tion and victim simplifies matters. Motives express themselves
differently, depending upon whether the persecution is produced
by the victim's conduct, identity or, as with domestic violence, very
existence. Though express motives are unclear, recognition of
these different types of persecutors and types of persecution eases
this evidentiary requirement, as motives are uniquely linked to the
varying forms of persecution.7 7 And, since the non-state actor may
take on many forms, and asylum law protects victims of each, it
must recognize equally the claims of all.
175. David Parish formulated a theory of group membership based on "social reso-
nance." In that pre-Elias piece, he recognized that membership can be based on factors such
as shared past experience, association with particular acts (gay men and lesbians) as well as
other factors that set people apart in particular cultures. See Parish, supra note 22, at 946-53.
176. For example, at one point the school he was attending asked his mother to con-
sent to his expulsion because of his behavior. Worse, he was prevented from attending
another school because his school refused to transfer the paperwork elsewhere unless he
changed his orientation. His parents threw him out of his own home after his expulsion.
Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1088.
177. Professor Moore noted that In re R-A- exemplifies the difficulty in discerning mo-
tives of the non-state actor, seeing it as a "painful example of the inappropriateness of the
Elias-Zacarias Court's conception of persecution as flowing from a symmetrical causal rela-
tionship between the victim and the persecutor." Moore, supra note 99, at 83 n.94. However,
that failure was not the inevitable product of Elias-Zacarias, but represented the failure to
properly understand the concept of social group in the setting of domestic violence. Since
motive is uniquely linked to persecution, it varies with the form the persecution takes.
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V. THE CHALLENGE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The majority in R-A- misunderstood the broad cultural implica-
tions of domestic violence and thus perpetuated many longstanding
myths. Falling prey to the notion that domestic violence is a private
matter, that opinion furthered the false dichotomy between public
and private that pervades so much discussion of domestic violence. 7
As Professor Deborah Rhode noted:
Women have been battered for centuries, but it was not until
the 1970s that their private experience became a public
concern. Like sexual harassment, domestic violence has been
an area where the force of law meddled little with the law of
force.
179
As she explained, law's inadequate responses to domestic vio-
lence stem from its misconceptions ofjust what it represents. Thus,
so long as "domestic disturbances" are regarded as private, family
matters, legal intervention is ineffective. s In failing to see Rodi
Alvarado's predicament as anything beyond a domestic problem,
the R-A- majority treated her situation as her unique problem,
rather than as a tragic manifestation of a troubled culture.
Despite mounting evidence of the seriousness of domestic vio-
lence, legal systems frequently reinforce those boundaries between
private and public, trivializing the plight of the victims. 1" Fortu-
nately, these notions are eroding, as evidence depicts relationships
of profound inequality. Thus, though the explanations for domes-
tic violence are "complex and certainly multifactorial" we
increasingly recognize that the "structures of society-be they eco-
nomic, political or legal-act to confirm this inequality" between
men and women.
12
178. See Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the Domestic' Sphere:
The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 401 (2001).
179. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 237
(1989).
180. Id. at 239. As one commentator noted, "far from being individual, random acts,
violence against women at the hands of their partners is a pervasive and systemic exercise of
patriarchal power." Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the 'Cul-
tural Hook 'for Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1563, 1588 (2001).
181. See RHODE, supra note 179, at 241. Professor Rhode recounted a chilling story in
which ajudge "castigated a battered wife for wasting his time with her request for a protec-
tive order." That woman died and her husband faced murder charges. Id.
182. Violence Against Women in the Family, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IV.5 (1989).
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Elias-Zacarias became the vehicle for bringing these challenges
into asylum law. Previously, few sources had focused so closely on
the "on account of' provision of the refugee definition. Following
Elias, hundreds of cases focused on the nexus issue, thus bringing
it to exceptional prominence. Yet, in the myriad discussions that
followed Elias, few commentators either paid serious attention to
the context-sensitive nature of nexus inquiries or openly examined
the various notions of causation that enjoy legal currency.
A. Doctrinal Developments in Causation
and Persecutory Motive
In her analysis of the nexus clause, Michelle Foster discussed the
various legal formulations of cause. 83 Warning against the dangers
of "transplanting" a notion of cause from an unrelated area of
law,8 4 she properly focused on its role in asylum cases. In tort law
and criminal law, for example, causation helps "ascertain legal re-
sponsibility for a wrong."8" However, asylum law is forward-looking.
It focuses on "protecting those who are persecuted and not on ap-
portioning liability and blame for wrongful acts.'08 6 A test for
causation based on sole cause or even the "but for" notion might
impose too great a burden on the asylum seeker.
Transplanting civil or criminal law notions of causation is par-
ticularly problematic in the setting of the non-state actor. Because
of the "diverse and complex" aims of the non-state actor, the goals
of protection would be frustrated by the imposition of a stringent
test for causation. 8 7 Those causation models simply don't fit, as
they fail to capture the "complexity of the factual situations and
the interlinked matrix of factors that often lead to a person's need
for international surrogate protection.... 18
Accordingly, Foster rejected causation tests that would
disadvantage the asylum seeker, ultimately endorsing the notion of
"contributing cause.' ' 189 Adoption of that view would best fulfill "the
aims and objectives of the Convention. '"' 90 The applicant would
183. See Foster, supra note 96.
184. Id. at 298.
185. Id. at 294.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 296.
188. Id. at 273.
189. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
190. See Foster, supra note 96, at 298.
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enjoy the protection that is the touchstone of asylum, yet would
only do so were the persecution feared for Convention reasons.
The nexus element is context-sensitive, and in domestic violence
cases plays out in terribly intimate, often longstanding relation-
ships. As previously discussed,' 9' since persecution obviously takes
on different forms in varying settings, the nexus analysis must vary
as the facts demand. The R-A- majority apparently sought some sort
of showing of punitive intent on the part of Alvarado's husband.
Although it ostensibly recognized that she had been persecuted, l:2
its examination of the persecutory behavior misconceived the rela-
tionship between his conduct and the nexus requirement, seeming
to require some sort of conscious intent on his part to punish her
for Convention reasons. Asylum law does not require that.
For some time, it has been clear that persecution exists in the
absence of punitive intent. For example, in Pitcherskaia v. INS' 3 the
applicant feared persecution on account of her support of gay and
lesbian causes in Russia and her status as a Russian lesbian.' Diag-
nosed with a "slow-going schizophrenia,"' 95 she was forced to
undergo a number of therapy sessions that included drug injec-
tions and electroshock treatments, and was involuntarily confined
on several occasions. The Board nonetheless denied her relief,
since the treatments were "intended to cure the supposed illness,
not to punish."'196
The Ninth Circuit reversed emphatically. Refining Elias-Zacarias,
it properly separated the element of persecution from that of
nexus. For that court, persecution is an objective concept, satisfied
if the harm inflicted is "offensive,"'9 7 from the perspective of the
reasonable person. Then, so long as that harm was inflicted upon
the victim because of a Convention reason, it is entirely irrelevant
whether the persecutor intended "to inflict harm and suffering in
an effort to punish."' 9s The intent to act in a manner that is objec-
tively persecutory is satisfactory, and there would be no need for
the persecutor to regard himself as one.
191. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
193. 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997). See also In Re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A.
June 13, 1996) (holding that" 'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is not required").
194. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643.
195. Id. at 644.
196. Id. at 646.
197. Id. at 647.
198. Id. As the court said: "The fact that a persecutor believes the harm he is inflicting is
'good for' his victim does not make it any less painful to the victim, or, indeed remove the
conduct from the statutory definition of persecution." Id. at 648.
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The "contributing cause" test for causation obviously eases the
burden on the asylum seeker. However, by introducing the notion
of motivation into the nexus analysis, the Elias-Zacarias Court
added additional complications. Even assuming that an applicant
can meet this appropriate standard, it is unclear just what must be
proved. Motive is a puzzling legal concept,' 99 and its use here is
particularly troubling. Yet, since it speaks to the mental state of the
persecutor, it is useful to borrow from analogous areas of law.
When we say that the persecutor acted for Convention reasons,
we may mean one of two things. We may mean that he acted in re-
sponse to a Convention characteristic that he chose to suppress. In
the setting of domestic violence, that would presumably mean that
he meant to persecute his wife or another because he wished to
assert that sort of repressive power over women in intimate rela-
tionships. Thus, recognizing the symmetry of persecution and
victim, that would be demonstrated by proof of a regular, discerni-
ble pattern of abuse over some period of time. The very pattern of
conduct would establish the nexus between being a woman and
being persecuted.
However, criminal law recognizes a useful distinction between
motive and intent, and sheds some light on the relationship be-
tween these concepts in the asylum context. Inquiry into motive
might yield a variety of factors that, in concert, led to the abusive
conduct. Were that evidence even available, it might reveal exactly
the kind of mixed motives situations envisioned by Borja.°° Yet, the
criminal law inquiry into intent asks another question, whether the
actor intended to cause the social harm prohibited by the relevant
statute. 20 1 That inquiry produces more tangible, less elusive an-
swers. Rodi Alvarado's husband clearly intended to injure and
brutalize her.
But the criminal law model isn't wholly satisfactory, and its
distinctions between motive and intent are only partially useful.
Criminal law examines discrete events, asking questions about
the actor's conduct and mental state. Domestic violence, as a
pathological syndrome, represents a continuing phenomenon, a
dynamic, ongoing feature of a relationship. Thus, with each
criminal act, the batterer demonstrates his criminal intent. But the
pattern of conduct over the course of the relationship, reveals a
199. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 121 (3rd ed. 2001);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 241 (3rd ed. 2000).
200. Borja v. INS, 175 F3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
201. SeeDRESSLER, supra note 199, at 121.
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pattern from which the "motive" to persecute can not only be
discerned, but unavoidably must be.
Theoretically, these two forms of inquiry converge, as those ac-
tuated by the need to control and dominate also intend the
disastrous results produced. Yet the very talk of "motive" infuses a
factor into the discussion that might sidetrack decision-makers. It
might lead to the kind of particularized inquiry into psychology
requiring a showing that Alvarado's husband conceived of women
as a protected social group, saw them as warranting Convention
protection, yet persecuted her to deny her the basic human right
to be free from such abuse. That approach places absurd demands
on the asylum seeker. To continue the analogy to criminal law, not
only requires proof of the intent to persecute, but requires proof
of knowledge that the victim is a member of a protected group for
Convention purposes. That approach vastly exceeds the Court's
requirements in Elias-Zacarias and makes a shambles of common
notions of what actuates human behavior.
Inquiry into intent alone, then, is entirely consonant with the
protective purpose of asylum. Just as the forward-looking notion of
causation espoused by Ms. Foster furthers this objective, so too
does that of only requiring that a member of a protected group
face intentional acts of persecution. So long as the relationship re-
veals this pattern of abuse, characteristic of domestic violence, it
satisfies Convention requirements. Regardless of the thicket of fac-
tors that produced the violence, the results remain and command
recognition.
B. The International Response
The world community increasingly recognizes domestic violence
as a problem of enormous public concern. °2 Addressing the asy-
lum issues associated with such claims, state, regional and
international bodies are creating mechanisms to cope with these
claims, thus moving toward the acceptance of universal norms in
asylum practice. Recent UNHCR initiatives obviously further this
objective, but it does not stand alone. The European Commission
202. This is so, despite the assertions of some that recognition of gender-based persecu-
tion amounts to "cultural imperialism." See, e.g., Dan Stein, Gender Asylum Reflects
Mistaken Priorities, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humanright/brief/v3i3/
stein33.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
203. See, e.g., Guidelines on International Protection, supra notes 90-91.
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recently proposed a directive for the creation of a Common Euro-
pean Asylum System.20 4 Though massive in scope, -the directive
focuses on some of the chief concerns discussed in this Article.
Proceeding from the principle that asylum provides surrogate pro-
tection, the Commission sought to define social group in a "broad
and inclusive manner."2 5 By its thinking, social group encompasses
those sharing fundamental characteristics, yet also includes groups
who are "treated as 'inferior' or as 'second class' in the eyes of the
law. , 0 6 It explicitly places women victimized by domestic violence
into that group:
That inclusion depends on the unavailability of state protection.
The Commission elaborated substantially on the phenomenon of
the non-state actor, providing asylum only when the state was "un-
willing or effectively unable" to protect the individual.2 Because its
touchstone was effective protection, it would deny asylum only
when there is "no significant risk of persecution or other serious
harm being realized."2" The Commission then provided eleven fac-
tors to be used in deciding whether state protection is lacking,
including general country conditions and state officials' responses
to individual requests for protection.2 0 Their use can help deter-
mine whether the applicant's human rights were afforded true and
tangible protection.
State practice in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand
mirror this approach. These notions reach particular maturity in the
case law of Australia and New Zealand. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99
confronted a dreadful situation: an Iranian woman sought asylum in
New Zealand after having been regularly beaten by her husband,
cast out of the family home, denied custody of her son and tortured
and harassed in her second marriage.211 She claimed refugee status
based on the grounds of religion, political opinion and member-
ship in a particular social group. In an opinion by Rodger Haines,
204. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on
Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and State-
less Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection (Sept.
9, 2001) (final version), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002 /dec/
com2001 0510en01.pdf [hereinafter European Commission].
205. Id. at art. 12, 1 4.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at art. 9, 1 (emphasis in original).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2.
211. Refugee Appeal No 71427/99, 2000 NZAR 545, 2000 NZAR LEXIS 9 (Refugee
Status Appeals Auth. Aug. 16, 2000).
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the Refugee Authority focused particularly on her social group,
characterizing it simply as "women in Iran." 212 But the simplicity of
his social group characterization contrasts with his treatment of the
nexus requirement.
Proceeding from the virtual formula that "Persecution = Serious
harm + The failure of state protection,"213 Haines bifurcated the
nexus analysis. That is, persecution exists if either the persecution
is inflicted for Convention reasons or "the failure of state
protection is for reason of a Convention ground. ' '214 Thus, he
found that though the husband's behavior did not satisfy the nexus
requirement, she was entitled to refugee status because "the failure
by the state to protect her from that harm is for the Convention
reasons... ,,215 The nexus was between the state and the victim.
Though this ignores the social significance of domestic violence by
envisioning the persecutor's conduct as unrelated to Convention
reasons, it nevertheless provides an avenue for relief for those,
such as Rodi Alvarado, whom their countries have failed.
Indeed, Haines rejected any requirement for state complicity in
the persecution. Drawing from the Canadian decision of Ward,21'
the Refugee Authority concluded that the Convention does not
require state complicity in the persecution, but simply its inability
to afford protection. Thus, four situations may satisfy Convention
requirements:
1. Persecution committed by the state concerned,
2. Persecution condoned by the state concerned,
3. Persecution tolerated by the state concerned,
4. Persecution not condoned or tolerated by the state
concerned, but nevertheless present because the
state either refuses or is unable to offer adequate
211protection .
212. 2000 NZAR LEXIS at *88-89. ("[T]he evidence relating to Iran establishes that the
overarching characteristic of those fundamentally disenfranchised and marginalized by the
state is the fact that they are women.").
213. Id. at *90. This "formula" came from Refugee Women's Legal Group, Gender
Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims in the UK 1.17 (1998). See also, IMMI-
GRATION APPELLATE AUTHORITY, ASYLUM GENDER CLAIMS (2000).
214. 2000 NZAR LEXIS at *88, 90.
215. Id. at *95-96.
216. Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 289.
217. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, 2000 NZAR LEXIS 9, at *57-58.
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The unwavering focus on the need for state protection thus led
the Authority to require only a finding that the state was aware of
the need for aid, yet failed to provide it effectively. 18
However, the failure to recognize the significance of domestic
violence can skew the analysis, potentially denying protection to
deserving victims. The failure to recognize that, in the paradig-
matic case of domestic violence, the persecutor does indeed satisfy
the nexus requirement may lead to improper analysis and incor-
rect decisions. The High Court of Australia recently confronted a
gender-based claim, and while reaching the correct conclusion,
showed some methodological confusion."'
Ms. Khawar, a citizen of Pakistan, recounted a striking tale of
abuse. She had been repeatedly slapped, beaten so severely as to
require hospitalization, threatened with acid and, on one occasion,
doused with petrol, which her husband threatened to ignite. On
four occasions she went to the local police, yet never received a
satisfactory response. In fact, when she went to the police after the
petrol incident, she was told by the officer that women always tried
to blame their husbands for misfortunes of their own making, and
that they should "sort out their 'own work.' ,220
Although approving the legal basis for her claim, the Federal
Court of Australia's two opinions differed dramatically. Justice Hill
felt Mrs. Khawar was at risk of harm "because her husband was an
alcoholic who, when drunk, abused her. 2 2' Accordingly, he would
have denied relief, seeing this as a purely personal matter.
Justice Lindren saw the matter as more complex. Seeking a
bridge "between the state and privately motivated harassment,"
222
he felt that the mere failure to receive police protection did not,
itself, bridge this gap. Rather, he required "something more.2 23 He
wanted at least a showing of "a sustained or systemic absence of
state protection" for women because the state did not regard them
as deserving equal treatment under the laws as members of
society.
2 4
218. In fact, Haines expressly considered the majority and minority opinions in In Re
R-A, concluding that, on the nexus issue, "neither of the opinions meaningfully grapple
with the issues." Id. at 91.
219. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, [2002] HCA 14,
available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/highcourt/0/2002/0/20O2141114.htm (on
file with the University of Michigan Law Reform).
220. Id. at 95.
221. Id.at 81.




The Challenge of Domestic Violence
On appeal, the Justices of the High Court were equally divided.
Each Justice confronted the issue of whether women may be
afforded asylum protection "where the motivation of the
perpetrators of the violence is private. '"2  The opinions, taken
together, proceed along a continuum from a position identical to
that of Haines in Refugee Appeal, to one rather like that of the
majority in R-A-.
Of the Justices writing, only Callinan saw no cognizable claim.
Balking at finding that she belonged to a meaningful social
group, he saw her claims as a private matter. Though conceding
that the police may have failed her because of "her vulnerability
as a woman in an abusive relationship, '2 6 his comments about the
"personal characteristics of her relationship" illustrate the mis-
conception that domestic violence is a private matter.
By contrast, Justice Kirby's opinion echoed that of Haines. Rec-
ognizing that the role of state agents may vary from active
persecution to a simple inability to offer adequate protection, 7
Kirby saw compelling reasons to allow the claim throughout that
spectrum. For him, "it is sufficient that there is both a risk of seri-
ous harm to the applicant from human sources and a failure on
the part of the state to afford protection that is adequate to uphold
the basic human rights and dignity of the person."22 Unmoved by
the claim that the definition of the social group was too wide and
the nexus unclear,22 he focused on the denial of human rights by a
state that has "withdrawn the protection of the law and its agen-
cies. 
,,230
Chief Justice Gleeson's opinion fell perplexingly between these
extremes. As did Callinan, he leaned toward a persecution model
in which the state must play an active role as persecutor. For him, it
would not suffice to show mere "misadministration, incompetence,
or ineptitude" by the police.22' Only a showing of "tolerance or
condonation" of domestic violence would do, one demonstrating a
"systematic discriminatory implementation of the law."2 2 Thus,
straying from a simple protection model, he would grant her claim
225. Id. at 15.
226. Id. at 152.
227. Id. at 71 91-132.
228. Id. at 115.
229. Id. at 7 126 (refuting the argument of the Minister that because of the "width" of
the group, the nexus could not exist).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 26.
232. Id.
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only if the state were actually blameworthy. Given his attribution of
"private reasons to her husband and his relatives, she could only
satisfy the Convention definition by showing the state's "motiva-
tion" to persecute her.3 4 This squares the circle, for since he sought
accountability, the basis for it only lay in either active wrongdoing
or knowing tolerance of reparable abuse by the state. Though lack-
ing a common approach to the claim, the High Court found it
cognizable, declining to settle the issue of whether or not the relief
depends on the blameworthiness of the state, or its simple failure
to provide protection.
Deborah Anker has long urged the adoption of a human rights
23"paradigm for the analysis of asylum claims. " The question is not
whether the state is blameworthy, but whether, for whatever rea-
sons, it has failed to protect its citizens. If it has, and if that failure
is not aberrational, then asylum must be granted.
The issues have shifted, then. State practice as well as regional
and international materials support gender as a basis for group
membership. The nexus requirement clearly does not require
proof that group membership was the sole or even chief reason for
persecution. Yet two features of domestic violence claims still re-
quire development.
First, virtually all judges who have addressed these claims see the
problem as one of providing standards for protecting people from
purely personal acts of violence. This mischaracterizes and risks
inadvertently trivializing domestic violence. As Anker suggests, the
husband provides the link between the Convention and the victim,
236not the state. He is the persecutor and, as has been explained
here, persecutes on account of Convention reasons. However, since
asylum provides surrogate protection when one's home state has
failed, it is still necessary to develop standards to determine the
237adequacy of state protection, and thus the availability of asylum.
That's where Judge Lindgren's "something more" becomes in-
triguing, as he focused on the second inquiry of when the state has
failed its citizens. Lindgren was troubled by the possibility that the
state failure might not reflect its true pattern ofjustice. The failure
233. Id. at 31.
234. Id.
235. Anker, supra note 115.
236. After discussing the social significance of domestic violence, Anker went on to
write that "the linkage to a Convention reason, be it to 'women' as a particular social group
or political opinion, can be the non-state actor husband, not Uust] the enabling state."
Anker, supra note 178, at 401.
237. SeeAnker, supra note 115, at 148.
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could have been "atypical," due to a particular officer's "attitude or
ineptitude," "systemic inefficiency" or an officer's simple reluc-
tance to become involved in a particular dispute. 38 Seeking a





The risk of unfairly branding a state as discriminatory recedes if
it is recognized that the actor himself is the persecutor, not the
state. It is both more accurate and more palatable to find that the
state has met the European Commission standard of being "unwill-
ing or effectively unable" to protect its citizens.24° Whereas an
accountability theory for the state might require that the state is
directly responsible for the persecution, or at least supports it, a
protection theory does not.:21 It only remains, then, to develop stan-
dards to determine when the state has, however innocently,
breached this lesser standard.
Although the European Commission's test of "unwilling or effec-
tively unable" does not readily lend itself to bright line decision-
making, it is not necessarily precluded. On the contrary, in pro-
pounding this test, it created a standard, not a rule of easy
application. Thus, the Commission recommended that its imple-
mentation depends on successfully answering two questions:
whether the state has taken or may take adequate steps to prevent
harm and whether the applicant has reasonable access to state pro-
242~tection.2 - The answers may reveal a rich, perhaps bewildering array
of facts, but that is to be expected. Over time, they will form famil-
iar patterns, as the law matures and becomes increasingly aware of
distinctive patterns of persecution.
238. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, [2002] HCA 14, at
1 54.
239. Chiefjustice Gleeson was also evidently worried about this kind of rebuff, warning
about the need to learn well country conditions before "reaching a conclusion that what
occurs in another country amounts to persecution by reason of the attitude of the authori-
ties to the behavior of private individuals." Id. at 1 26.
240. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
241. See Catherine Phuong, Persecution by Third Parties and European Harmonization of Asy-
lum Policies, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 81, 83 (2001). Phuong urged the adoption of the
protection model since "[a] human rights approach to refugee protection, and particularly
to the meaning of persecution, leads to an extension of that system of protection to those
fearing persecution by non-state agents where there is a failure of state protection." Id. at 88.
242. European Commission, supra note 204, at art. 9.
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C. Applying the European Commission Standard
The social perception theory of group membership easily identi-
fies the beset. Those perceived as different are vulnerable, so long
as discrimination is culturally supported and access to redress is
unrealistic. Guatemala, for example and many other countries, are
rife with domestic violence. Some estimate that as many as nine of
ten women in Guatemala suffer domestic abuse.243 Indeed, as the
State Department indicated, domestic violence "remained com-
mon among all social classes," yet few convictions have been
reported.244
Yet, as the State Department Report indicates, that pattern of
violence is not only self-perpetuating, but is even reinforced in the
law. Article 114 of the Guatemalan Civil Code, for example, gives
the husband the right to prohibit his wife from working outside the
home.245
That provision does not stand in isolation. Numerous provisions
of that code represent the legislative enshrinement of gender-based
discrimination. They were challenged recently in Guatemala, but
the Guatemalan Court of Constitutionality upheld them, reasoning
that they provided 'juridical certainty" about the allocations of roles
in marriage. 46 The Center for Justice and International Law and
Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra subsequently filed a claim seeking
relief with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Petitioners claimed that nine provisions of the Guatemalan
Code foundered on both the American Convention on Human
Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women.247 That latter Convention defined
discrimination against women to include any gender-based distinc-
tion that has the effect of denying to women "human rights and
243. The Guatemalan Women's Human Rights Defense Committee, reprinted in 16
GUAT. Hum. RTS. UPDATE 5 (August 18, 2000).
244. S. PRT. No. 107-32, at 2606 (2001). Indeed, as of that date, only two convictions
had occurred in the country's history. Id.
245. Under that provision, "the husband may object to his wife pursuing activities out-
side the home, so long as he provides adequately for maintenance of the home and has
sufficiently justified grounds for objection." Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Report No 4/01* (Jan. 19, 2001) (Case 11.625, Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra), available
at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/ ChapterlIl/Merits/Guatemaal 1.625.htn
[hereinafter Report].
246. Id.
247. Id. See also, CEDAW, supra note 107.
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fundamental freedoms in the political, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.,
248
The Commission granted relief on all counts. Rejecting the
Guatemalan court's view that the provisions achieved juridical
certainty, it found that the "cited provisions institutionalize
imbalances in the rights and duties of the spouses," thus creating an
"insurmountable disequilibrium" within marriage. 2 4 9 Not only had
the Code failed its people, but through it, so had the state of
Guatemala. The Commission found those provisions not only
represented distorted, discriminatory views of women, but worse,
they undermined the "duty of the State " to assure all citizens equal
participation in society.
250
Rodi Alvarado did not participate equally in Guatemalan society.
She was victimized by the combined effect of a law that divided a
people and practices that reinforced that law. When she sought
protection, both the police and court system effectively abandoned
her. ' Strikingly, though the Board found that the views of
Guatemalan society and government resulted in "tolerance of
spouse abuse at levels we find appalling, 5 2 it denied her claim
because domestic violence was only tolerated, not "desired. 2 53 The
European Commission standard was violated.
The European Commission called for an analysis of the formal
structures for protection, as well as the feasibility of gaining access
to that protection. Law enforcement agencies in Guatemala were
clearly unwilling to "detect, prosecute and punish offenders."
2 5 4
Moreover, not only did her husband boast that he was beyond state
control,2 5 5 but her efforts to obtain protection were completely fu-
tile. 56 As a member of a protected group, she was persecuted,
sought help from the state and found none. The claim for asylum
was complete.
248. CEDAW, supra note 107, art. I.
249. See Report, supra note 246, at 44.
250. Id. at 45.
251. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
252. In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 922 (B.1.A.June 11, 1999).
253. Id.
254. See European Commission, supra note 204, at art. 9(2) (e).
255. Alvarado's husband claimed that "because of his military service, calling the police
would be futile as he was familiar with law enforcement officials." In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec.
at 909. See also European Commission, supra note 204, at art. 9(2) (i) ("[E]vidence by the appli-
cant that the alleged persecutors are not subject to the State's control.").
256. The European Commission also considers the "qualitative nature of the access" to
protection and the state's response to steps taken by the applicant to obtain protection.
European Commission, at art. 9(2) (j)-(k).
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CONCLUSION
Lamenting the plight of those from failed states, Jennifer Moore
envisioned a human rights law that protects all victims of
persecution . But failed states are not just those whose governing
institutions have collapsed, but also those that have failed to
provide surrogate protection for those victimized elsewhere.2 5 As
recounted above, those victims suffer twice, both through the
betrayal of their citizenship rights and in the failure of third
countries to provide surrogate protection.
These failures are not inevitable. Though the Convention does
not explicitly deal with these victims of domestic violence, it easily
affords them protection. Here, we should learn from the efforts of
the world community, as its lessons are remarkably simple. The
touchstone is whether the applicants' home countries have failed,
in being unable or unwilling to ensure them safe lives as citizens,
free from abuse. The "social group" is simply women. The persecu-
tors are their husbands, as non-state actors. So long as the pattern
of abuse can rightly be called domestic violence, the nexus re-
quirement is met, as this repeated infliction of harm unmistakably
reveals the intent to inflict the kind of cruelty contemplated by the
Convention. In a tragic irony, this confluence of factors not only
meets the Convention requirements, but presents the clearest,
most urgent case for surrogate protection.
257. Moore, supra note 99, at 120. "Modern Human rights law must embrace the full
range of human experience and provide remedies for violations of human dignity by non-
state actor and state actor alike." Id.
258. Id. at 121.
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